Pakistan’s gamble backfires as taliban power surge
- Pakistan’s miscalculation: a dangerous gamble
- A bitter pill: airstrikes and border clashes
- The price of proxy support
- The ttp’s resurgence: a consequence of taliban power
- A strategic misstep: the failed “good jihadist” distinction
- A desperate gambit: airstrikes and economic pressure
- The taliban’s new reality: a war economy
Pakistan’s miscalculation: a dangerous gamble
Days after the Taliban seized power in 2021, Pakistan’s then-spymaster, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, expressed optimism, assuring reporters that "everything will be OK." This sentiment now appears tragically misplaced. Recent events reveal a significant miscalculation by Islamabad regarding its ability to control the consequences of the Taliban’s ascendance, leading to escalating tensions and direct conflict.

A bitter pill: airstrikes and border clashes
Pakistan has been forced to take drastic measures, including airstrikes in Afghanistan, and has witnessed military clashes on the border with the Taliban-controlled territory. Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif stated that Pakistan’s patience had run out after repeated calls for the Taliban to prevent Pakistani militants from using Afghan soil as a base for attacks. This situation mirrors accusations leveled against Pakistan by the US-led international coalition prior to 2021, alleging that Pakistan allowed the Taliban to operate as a safe haven.
The price of proxy support
Kamran Bokhari, of the New Lines Institute, describes the current crisis as "blowback." He argues that supporting proxies who challenge a nation’s identity inevitably leads to repercussions. This echoes Hillary Clinton’s 2011 warning to Pakistan: "You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors." Afghanistan is not Pakistan’s only concern; a weakening Iran threatens instability on the western border, and Tehran is no longer capable of managing the Taliban.
The ttp’s resurgence: a consequence of taliban power
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group that terrorized Pakistan for a decade following the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, has experienced a resurgence since the Taliban takeover. The TTP had previously collaborated with the Taliban against international forces in Afghanistan, and their networks were integrated. With the Taliban now in power, the TTP is seeking to impose its extreme interpretation of Islam on Pakistan, a nation with a predominantly Muslim population.
A strategic misstep: the failed “good jihadist” distinction
Pakistan’s strategy involved distinguishing between “good” Afghan jihadists and “bad” Pakistani insurgents. This distinction, however, proved fragile. Many Taliban members have joined the TTP, rendering the initial assessment obsolete. Mosharraf Zaidi, spokesperson for Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, condemned any notion that the current crisis is Pakistan’s retribution, emphasizing the ongoing need to stop terrorism within Pakistan.
A desperate gambit: airstrikes and economic pressure
Antonio Giustozzi of the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) reveals Pakistan’s strategy of inflicting pain on Afghanistan through airstrikes and an economic blockade, aiming to force a change in the Taliban’s leadership. However, this strategy has backfired, strengthening Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s leader, who has responded with renewed nationalism. Furthermore, the Taliban are now supporting a secular insurgency in Pakistan’s resource-rich Balochistan province.
The taliban’s new reality: a war economy
Asif Durrani, Pakistan’s former special envoy for Afghanistan, states that the Taliban chose to align with the TTP over prioritizing Pakistan’s interests, demonstrating their transformation into a “war economy.” They are no longer functioning as a government but remain in a militant mindset. The TTP, now led by Noor Wali Mehsud, has consolidated its factions and shifted its focus from civilian targets to army and police.